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Abstract 
 
 
The Africa Region Working Paper Series expedites dissemination of applied research and policy studies 
with potential for improving economic performance and social conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
series publishes papers at preliminary stages to stimulate timely discussions within the Region and among 
client countries, donors, and the policy research community.  The editorial board for the series consists of 
representatives from professional families appointed by the Region’s Sector Directors.  For additional 
information, please contact Momar Gueye, (82220), Email: mgueye@worldbank.org or visit the Web Site: 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/index.htm. 
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in this paper are those of the authors.  
They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive 
Directors, or the countries that they represent and should not be attributed to them. 
Faced with a production shortfall in early 2004 and a sharp rise in the price of 
imported rice due to a depreciation of the Malagasy franc and a spike in international rice 
prices, Madagascar attempted to stabilize domestic rice prices through public tenders for 
rice imports and subsidized sales at official prices.  This paper discusses the 2004 rice 
crisis, chronicling the events that triggered the crisis and the subsequent interventions by 
the government, and analyzes the impacts of the policies adopted and steps taken to spur 
development of the domestic rice market.  Using a partial equilibrium model, the paper 
also quantifies the overall costs and benefits of a change in import duties for various 
household groups, and compares this intervention to a policy of targeted food transfers or 
security stocks. as well as other options for price stabilization, including a reduction in 
import duties and a security stock policy.  
  
1. Introduction 
 
Bart Minten and Paul Dorosh 
 
Agricultural markets play an important role in the welfare of the population in 
agricultural economies. If markets function badly, they lead to lower incomes for producers, 
higher prices for consumers and reduced household welfare. In Madagascar, rice markets are 
particularly important, since rice is the most important staple and rice production is a major 
source of income and employment. Levels and stability of rice prices thus have major effects 
on welfare of rice farmers (about 60 percent of the population) and consumers (essentially 
the entire population).   
 
Rice markets in Madagascar, however, do not function well, in large part because of 
high transactions costs that limit trade and lower market efficiency. High transport costs 
within the country as well as to international markets are one major component of 
transactions costs, but other institutional and policy factors also play a role. Insecurity arising 
from theft of stocks or rice shipments limits profitability of rice trade. Lack of institutions to 
effectively enforce contracts and to resolve contract disputes inhibits the use of contracts and 
therefore the development of more sophisticated trade. Similarly, absence of institutional 
credit constrains grain storage for many farmers and small traders (Fafchamps, 2004). 
 
Government policies to spur development of rice markets, stabilize prices and provide 
appropriate price incentives for producers and consumers have varied considerably over time, 
alternating between government interventionism and market liberalization. From the early to 
mid-1980s, the government intervened heavily in rice markets, as government parastatals 
were the sole legal purchasers of rice from producers and government sales of subsidized rice 
dominated urban markets. Market liberalization in the later 1980s resulted in far less 
government intervention, but with mixed results. Liberalization did not lead to widespread 
rice shortages as some critics had feared, but did not lead to a large positive supply effect, 
either, in part due to other constraints on production and markets. While margins were large 
and seasonal variation high (especially in rural areas), there was no evidence that this did not 
reflect costs. However, a production shortfall in early 2004 and subsequent sharp price 
increases led the government again to intervene in markets, imposing restrictions on rice 
imports and prices, and re-starting direct distribution and sales of rice.   
 
The objectives of this report are to describe the functioning of rice markets in 
Madagascar and to analyze policy options for rice market development and price 
stabilization, with a special focus on the 2004 rice crisis.   Although the analysis has 
implications for medium-term rice policy and social protection, the report is not intended to 
be an overall review of these broader issues.  Section two presents an overview of the rice 
economy of Madagascar, including production and consumption patterns over time and the 
structure of the rice value chain. In section three, we discuss the 2004 rice crisis, including 
the events that triggered the crisis and the subsequent interventions by the government. 
Section four discusses the aftermath of the crisis and lessons learnt. Section five lays out 
options for price stabilization, discussing the benefits and costs of a reduction in import 
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duties and a security stock policy. The last section includes a summary and policy 
conclusions.    
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2. The rice economy of Madagascar 
 
Bart Minten, Marie-Hélène Dabat and Ziva Razafintsalama 
 
2.1. Production  
 
2.1.1. Historical context and trends 
 
Madagascar is a rice economy par excellence as documented by different studies and 
datasets.2 For example, a commune census that was conducted in 2001 shows that the rice 
crop is stated to be the most important crop in the majority of the communes of the country, 
in terms of both area and value of production (Graphs 1 and 2). The only region where the 
rice crop is stated to be less important is in the eastern part of the country – where cash crops 
are a more important source of incomes - and the south where maize and cassava are the 
main crops. The latter region is characterized by a drier climate that makes rice production 
more problematic than in the rest of the country.3  
 
However, performance in the rice sector has been sluggish (World Bank, 2003a; 
Bockel, 2003). While the total production of rice increased from 1,9 million tons in 1970 to 
3,0 million tons in 2004, the per capita production has fallen from 237 kg per year in 1970 to 
179 kg per year in 2004 (FAO). Population growth, at an annual average of almost 3%, has 
thus mostly outpaced production growth (Graph 3). As the cultivated area in rice has 
increased on average by 0,6% per year and yields by 0,5% per year over the period as a 
whole, total production increased by 1,1%, i.e. significantly below population growth.  
 
Rice productivity in Madagascar started off on the same, or even better, footing as 
other countries, such as Mali and Indonesia (Graph 4). While yields stayed relatively stable 
in Madagascar, they increased significantly in these other two countries. Yields in Indonesia 
and Madagascar were similar in the beginning of the 1970s, but today yields in Indonesia 
exceed those in Madagascar by 2.5 tons per hectare. Yields in Mali were significantly lower 
than those in Madagascar in the beginning of the 1970s, but are now approximately the same 
as those in Madagascar.  
 
The rice production technologies used in Madagascar are still largely traditional. The 
Green Revolution that increased rice yields in other rice economies has largely bypassed 
Madagascar. Local rice production is characterized by high labor intensity and few external 
inputs. The adoption of improved agricultural technologies is low. Nonetheless, there have 
been some changes over the years (Table 1). For example, using statements based on recall 
questions to focus groups in a nationally representative commune survey in 2004, it is 
                                                 
2 See Bockel, 2002; Fraslin, 2002; IFPRI-FOFIFA, 1998; Le Bourdiec, 1974; Minten and Zeller, 2000; Pryor, 
1990; Razafindravonona et al., 2001; Roubaud, 1997; UPDR-FAO, 2000; World Bank, 2003; Dorosh et al., 
1990; Dorosh, 1994; Dorosh et al., 2003.   
3 Compared to ten years earlier, little change has been noted: the number of communes that reported rice as their 
main crop in value terms decreased by about 8%. However, this is partly explained by the high prices of cloves 
and vanilla in the year 2001. 
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estimated that the use of improved seeds, chemical fertilizer and in-line transplanting has 
slightly improved over the last fifteen years.  
 
The lack of big changes in production and productivity is reflected in the trend of the 
real price levels (Graph 5). The real price of rice in the period 2000-2003 (as measured by the 
retail price of rice in Antananarivo divided by the non-rice consumer price index for 
Antananarivo) is similar to the level in the middle of the 1980s (i.e. just after the market 
liberalization measures that had been taken). This is in contrast with countries such as 
Bangladesh that saw a drop in the real price level of rice over time due a change in 
productivity driven by government investments in roads and irrigation infrastructure (Dorosh 
et al., 2004).    
 
2.1.2. Current situation 
 
85% of current agricultural producers, representing 60% of the total population, 
cultivate rice, illustrating the importance of rice in the agricultural sector. Rice productivity 
varies according to cropping system (Bockel, 2002; Keck et al., 1993; Minten et al., 2003; Le 
Bourdiec, 1974; UPDR-FAO, 2000). These include lowland rice, rainfed upland rice and 
tavy (or upland slash-and-burn) rice. Most of the rice in Madagascar is produced on 
lowlands: Based on the data of the national household survey of 2001 (the ‘Enquête 
Permanente auprès des Ménages’ or EPM), 89% of the rice plots are estimated to be situated 
in lowlands. Yields are highest on these lowlands, especially on plots with good water 
management (UPDR-FAO, 2000). Yields are significantly lower in upland rainfed cropping 
systems (4% of the plots) and are lowest under slash-and-burn conditions (7% of the plots).4  
 
To get at the current problems in Malagasy rice productivity, rural focus groups were 
asked at the end of 2004 to evaluate the importance of different constraints to improve rice 
productivity (Table 2). For each constraint, they were given the choice between four 
categories, ranking from ‘not important’ to ‘very important’. 85% of the population stated 
that inadequate irrigation was the most important constraint to increasing rice productivity. 
The two other most important constraints as reported by these focus groups were access to 
cattle to work the land and access to better equipment.  Thus, lack of capital and investments 
are among the major perceived problems for improved rice productivity.5 
 
The low adoption of improved technologies and low productivity is explained by a 
multitude of reasons and is difficult to link to one specific cause (Bernier and Dorosh, 1993; 
                                                 
4 The highland plots might be larger in size as UPDR-FAO (2000) estimates that about 10% of the rice area is in 
rainfed uplands. 
5 It is also interesting to note the constraints that are not considered to be that important. They include more 
secure property rights and silt in the rice fields. While security in property rights is in general an important 
determinant for soil investment and thus higher productivity (Feder and Feeny, 1991), it seems that the overall 
land tenure situation is such that little land conflicts exist that would make such investments risky. An 
alternative explanation might be that credit markets, that might allow for such investments, are imperfect or 
missing and might not be linked with improved property rights as farmers currently know them.  Silting of 
ricefields is often linked to deforestation but this might cause less production problem than is commonly 
assumed, especially in the highlands (Brand et al., 2002; Larson, 1993). 
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De Laulanié, 2003; Bockel, 2002; Droy, 1997; Freudenberger, 1998; Goletti et al., 1997; 
Robbiliard, 1999; UPDR-FAO, 2000; Moser and Barrett, 2003). Chief among them are the 
lack of road and irrigation infrastructure (Stifel and Minten, 2003). Table 3 shows to what 
extent roads make a difference in the productivity of major agricultural products.  However, 
other factors matter as well (Minten and Barrett, 2005). They include a badly functioning and 
under-funded research and extension system, lack of credit, the lack of a local seed industry, 
the high climatic risks, an unclearly defined role of the state and insecurity problems.  
 
Increased use of chemical fertilizer was a major component of increased yields 
achieved through the green revolution in other countries.  However, chemical fertilizer use in 
Madagascar is one of the lowest in the world and has changed little over time. Only 6% of 
the plots are reported to receive any chemical fertilizer and the average application is only 3 
kg of nutrients per hectare during a typical year. The spatial distribution shows further that 
fertilizer use is heavily concentrated along roads (Graph 6 and Table 3). The low fertilizer 
use is largely explained by economic reasons. The ratio of the price of one kg of fertilizer 
over the price of a kg of paddy in rural areas hovers over time above 2. This is significantly 
above the ratio in Asian economies (in the case of India, the ratio of urea prices over paddy 
prices in 2004 was estimated at around 0.8). As paddy prices are similar to Asian rice 
economies, this unfavorable ratio is due to the high price of fertilizer in Madagascar due to 
the type of fertilizer that is being used6, the thin market, the high transport costs to bring 
fertilizer from abroad into the country, and government interventions in this market (Bockel, 
2002, 2003).  
 
2.2. Consumption 
 
Table 4 shows average calorie consumption in Madagascar over time. It illustrates the 
low overall calorie intake and the worsening trend over time: it is estimated that average per 
capita calorie consumption declined by 16% over a thirty year period. Rice is the most 
important plant product in Madagascar. It is estimated that it counted for about 48% of the 
total calorie consumption in 2002 (Table 5), with consumption per capita at about 95 kg per 
year (in 2002).7 The importance of rice in consumption is relatively and absolutely on the 
decline, however.  Rice accounted for 51% of total calorie consumption in 1970, compared to 
48% in 2002/2003.  Over the same period, cassava, the second most important crop, has 
become more important because of increasing poverty and its lower cost per calorie.  It also 
serves as a buffer crop in the off-season. As a result, cassava’s share in the supply of calories 
increased from 12% in 1970 to 20%(16%) in 2002 (2003). Meat consumption has declined 
relatively most over this 30-year period, i.e. by almost 30%, given declining incomes and the 
high income elasticities for meat products (Ravelosoa et al., 2000). 
 
The budget shares of rice in total (food and non-food) expenditures differ significantly 
by type of household. While the average weight is estimated at 26%, based on the household 
survey of 1993, this varies from 34% for the rural poor to 11% for the richest urban group 
(Ravelosoa et al., 1999). Rice consumption is shown to be more price and income elastic for 
                                                 
6 The most common type of fertilizer used in Madagascar is NPK 11:22:16. 
7 This compares to 164 kg per year in Bangladesh, 103 kg/year in Thailand and 75 kg/year in Senegal. 
Madagascar has the highest rice consumption per head in Africa. 
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poorer socio-economic groups.8 Most of rice consumption is from own production. Based on 
the national household survey data of 2001, it is estimated that about two thirds of the 
production of rice is auto-consumed. About 22% is purchased by the rural population and 
13% is bought by the urban areas. These numbers reflect the lower importance of urban 
markets in total local rice consumption. This is partly due to the large share of the population 
that lives in rural areas.   
 
Imported rice makes up the difference between local production and consumption. It is 
important to note that imported rice is not only consumed in urban areas: based on the 
numbers of the national household survey of 2001, it is estimated that about 60% of the 
consumption of imported rice was in rural areas. This compares to 40% in urban areas. 
However, urban areas depend relatively more on imported rice. Graph 7 shows 
geographically the presence of imported rice in rural areas. As expected, it shows that the 
presence is highly influenced by distances to a port and to good roads. 
 
Overall consumption, and rice consumption in particular, is further characterized by 
significant seasonality. Dostie et al. (2000) estimate that caloric intake declines by more than 
10% in the lean period compared to the harvest period (Table 5). The drop is highest for the 
poorest households. The composition of caloric intake also changes. The part of rice drops 
between 6% and 13% in rural areas and by a little over 1% in urban areas. This drop in the 
importance of rice is made up by a relative increase in consumption of cassava, other tubers 
and maize (Dostie et al., 2000). This seasonality in consumption is confirmed by other 
studies and shows up in welfare indicators. Based on a national survey, Unicef estimated for 
example that malnutrition rates were 15% higher during the lean period than during the 
harvest period (Seecaline, 1996). Mortality rates are also found to be higher in the lean 
period (Waltisberger et al., 1998).9      
 
2.3. The rice value chain 
 
2.3.1. Households 
 
Sales of rice are concentrated in the hands of a minority of agricultural producers 
(Table 6). Based on the national household survey of 2001, it is estimated that only a quarter 
of the agricultural households report sales of more than 250 kg of rice a year. Their sales 
represent 90% of all the local rice that is marketed in Madagascar. Almost half of the 
agricultural producers report no rice sales at all. They however are still producing more than 
a quarter of total Malagasy rice production. The households that report larger sales are also 
richer: their consumption level is almost a quarter higher than the average consumption level 
of agricultural producers.  
 
                                                 
8 Ravelosoa et al. (1999) show that the overall income elasticity for rice consumption is about 0.47 and that this 
increases to 0.75 for the poorest group (based on an AIDS – Almost Ideal Demand System – estimation). The 
same trends are seen in own price elasticities which vary from -0.48 for the richest rural group to -0.62 for the 
rural poor. We see thus high sensitivity in consumption with respect to prices and income. Similar results are 
found by Minten and Zeller (2000) based on a smaller survey.  
9 This is also partly due to the more humid conditions and the higher disease incidence during the lean period. 
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Net buyers of rice make up a large part of the population in Madagascar, also in rural 
areas (Barrett and Dorosh, 1996; Minten and Zeller, 2000; Minten et al., 2003). Estimates 
based on annual production and consumption data from the EPM 2001 indicate that 19% of 
the households in Madagascar are net sellers of rice, 11% are self-sufficient and 46% are net 
buyers (Table 7). 23% of the households are urban households and most of them can be 
considered net buyers (there is about 3% in the 24% that is a net seller). Almost 60% of the 
purchased rice in Madagascar is estimated to be consumed by the net buyers in rural areas. 
 
The location of net buyers and sellers differ. The most populated province of 
Antananarivo has the largest number of net buyers of rice (more than 800,000 households), 
partly due to the presence of the capital city of Antananarivo, while only a little over 100,000 
households in the province are net sellers (Table 8). This province thus depends significantly 
on other provinces (and countries) for their rice supply. The province of Mahajanga has 
relatively and absolutely the largest number of net rice sellers, and is a net exporter of rice in 
most years.10 Almost a quarter of the net rice sellers in Madagascar are located in this 
province. This compares to only 8% of all the net buyers. The Lac Alaotra area in the 
province of Toamasina contains the largest rice plain in Madagascar (with about 84,000 ha 
rice fields connected to a modern irrigation system (UPDR-FAO, 2000)). Its rice production 
counts for almost 15% of the national production but its commercial surplus is relatively 
much more important. UPDR-FAO (2000) estimates that about 220,000 tonnes of paddy are 
marketed in this area. It is thus a large provider of rice for the capital Antananarivo.    
 
The selling and buying activities in rice markets show strong links with poverty 
(Table 9). For the population as a whole it is estimated that 66% is a net buyer of rice, 13% is 
self-sufficient and 21% is a net seller. Self-sufficiency in rice decreases significantly with an 
increase in poverty. While a quarter of the poorest quintile does not participate in rice 
markets, this is only the case for 7% for the richest quintile. The percentage of net buyers 
increases systematically from the poorest (54%) to the richest households (81%). Even 
though the number of net buyers in the poorest quintile is the lowest of all, the percentage of 
net buyers in this category is still 2,5 times higher than the percentage of net sellers. Richer 
households purchase significantly more rice on the market (Table 9): the average quantity of 
rice bought varies from 132 kg per household for the poorest quintile to three times as much, 
i.e. 391 kg per household for the richest quintile. These differences are partly driven by the 
difference in activities as 44% of the richest quintile lives in urban areas compared to only 
8% for the poorest quintile.  
 
The poverty – purchase linkage still holds when we calculate the purchase statistics 
only for agricultural producers. The richest quintile of agricultural producers produces, sells, 
purchases and uses significantly more rice than the poorest quintile (Table 9). Almost one 
third of the poorest quintile sold and bought rice, often at significantly higher prices, during 
the same year. 20% did so for the richest quintile. This illustrates to what extent liquidity 
constraints might lead some of the poorer farmers to participate in rice markets.  
 
2.3.2. Seasonality 
                                                 
10 This explains why rice price decreased in this province (and increased in the province of Antananarivo) 
during the political crisis of 2002 when transport and trade between the two provinces was almost impossible. 
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The annual figures presented above ignore important seasonality. Even more 
households will buy rice in the lean period but this number will drop significantly during rice 
harvests. In the commune survey of 2004 a question was asked on the percentage of people 
that are net buyers or net sellers of rice during the four quarters of the year. The numbers 
illustrate the large seasonal swings. About half of the rural households were reported to be 
sellers of rice in the harvest period. During the lean period, 70% of the rural population is 
estimated to be a buyer of rice while only 8% of the rural households sell rice.  
 
Malagasy communes also often show a pattern of seasonal flow reversals in rice. 
While 66% of the communal focus groups state to have exported rice after the main harvest 
in April-June, 51% of the communes imported rice at the end of the year (Graph 9). As is the 
case in many developing countries, the rice flow occurs primarily during the harvest period 
and may actually reverse in the pre-harvest season (Barrett, 1996; Moser et al., 2005). Even 
if the flow itself does not reverse, interseasonal price variability might still be higher in rural 
areas than in urban ones. Some of the reasons cited for this include inadequate storage, 
market thinness, and intermediary market power in rural areas (Barrett 1996; Moser et al., 
2005). When rural areas experience significantly higher price variability, rural households 
are much more vulnerable to seasonal undernutrition. These statistics further illustrate that 
also rural areas are suffering from the high price of rice and other agricultural products in the 
lean period as they are often net buyers in this period. 
 
Moser et al. (2005) found, based on a nation-wide commune survey in 2001, that 
communes experienced an 84 percent increase in the rice price over the year and urban 
communes experience statistically significantly lower price changes. Given that both the 
urban and rural price changes considerably exceed prevailing interest rates (even adjusted for 
stock loss due to spoilage, etc.)11, there appears to be considerable foregone intertemporal 
arbitrage opportunities in Madagascar’s rice markets (Moser et al., 2005). Part of the 
seasonal price movements stems from seasonality in production and storage costs (due 
mostly to opportunity costs of funds). It is estimated at the national level that almost three 
quarters of the Malagasy rice production happens in four months, i.e. between March and 
June (Graph 10). The number of lowlands where double rice harvests are possible is 
relatively limited, due to lack of irrigation and to water problems. The lowlands where two 
rice harvests are possible are mostly found in the west of the country. While most households 
store and auto-consume part of their harvest over the year, the rice sales seem to happen in a 
period shortly after harvest. Richer households sometimes postpone sales and might therefore 
profit of higher prices (Graph 11).  
 
2.3.3. The trading sector  
 
Since the liberalization of the trading sector and before 2004, government refrained 
from intervention in rice trade and rice storage and rice traders are currently subject to few 
government interventions (Berg, 1989; Barrett, 1997; IFPRI-FOFIFA, 1998; UPDR-FAO, 
2000). Storage of rice by the government and the donors is limited to emergency stocks of 
                                                 
11 Micro-finance institutions in rural areas typically charge 3% monthly interest rates. 
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about 10,000 tons that is held by the World Food Program. These stocks are used for 
distribution in case of natural disasters.  
 
In the private rice trading sector, we see a myriad of traders, ranging from micro-
retailers to large rice millers/traders. While Barrett (1996) finds higher profits and high entry 
costs for the more profitable segments of the rice markets, Fafchamps et al. (2004) do not 
find any economies of scale. Based on a nation-wide trader survey, UPDR-FAO (2000) and 
IFPRI/FOFIFA (1998) find rice margins to be reasonable and to reflect capital, transportation 
and entrepreneurial costs of trade. For example, UPDR-FAO (2000) estimates that a high 
proportion (85%) of benefits of the rice value chain is captured at the production level in the 
form of income and salaries of agricultural workers.  
 
The liberalization of the rice market has also led to a restructuring of the trading 
sector. The importance of vertically integrated firms, that were previously widespread in the 
rice plains, has greatly diminished. They have been replaced by numerous small and highly 
specialized traders that work with their own capital and that show little sophisticated linkages 
(credit, orders) between layers (Dabat et al., 2004; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999).  
 
While the trade of local rice is mostly in the hands of small traders, this is less so for 
imported rice given the important financial requirements. Madagascar imports substantial 
quantities of rice from international markets. Imports in 2003 were estimated at 250.000 tons, 
representing more than 10% of the total consumption of the country and about 1% of the 
world trade in rice. Rice is mostly imported from Asian countries, mainly from Pakistan, 
India, and Thailand. These imports arrive in lots of about 1,000 to 4,000 by boat mostly from 
Asia. Imports are exclusively done by private importers and the total number of importers in 
a regular year amounts to about a dozen. The rice trade was fairly concentrated in 2004, with 
the largest 5 importers of rice accounting for almost 60% of all imported rice in Madagascar 
(Table 10).12  
 
The average annual imported quantity of rice over the last decade amounts to 120,000 
tons (Table 11). However, an increase is noticed over time, going from less than 60,000 in 
1996-1998 to 150,000 tons or more since 2000 (except for the crisis year 2002 when the 
political crisis disrupted regular trade). Imports are characterized by significant seasonality, 
arriving relatively more in the lean period and less during local harvests. The percentage of 
imports during the first six months of the year is usually higher than 50% of the total of the 
year. It was lowest in the year 2004 (except for the political crisis year 2002). We will 
discuss reasons for this later on.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This relatively high concentration of the import trade does not suggest that a competitive import trade is not 
possible, but it does suggest why the government is concerned about the possibility of collusion.  In contrast to 
the structure of the Madagascar market, over two hundred traders imported rice across land borders from India 
to Bangladesh following major production shortfalls in Bangladesh in 1997 and 1998 (Dorosh, 2001).   
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2.3.4. Pricing 
 
To a large extent, Madagascar has opted for a policy of market stabilization through 
private sector trade since a period of structural adjustment in the late 1980s.13  Private sector 
imports have occurred almost every year, stabilizing rice prices in the months prior to the 
major rice harvest.  Although structural adjustment policies in sub-Saharan Africa have often 
led to increased price variability, the private sector rice import trade generally has kept rice 
prices in Madagascar more stable than prices of major staples in other African countries, 
such as Ethiopia and Zambia (Table 12).   
 
Since Madagascar is a net importer of rice, in the absence of trade and market 
restrictions, the price of imports in the local market is determined by the full cost of imports 
(including the c&f cost, tariffs, taxes, transport, handling and marketing costs). Table 13 
shows the different costs required to bring imported rice into the Malagasy market in the 
beginning of 2004.14 Two types of duties are levied on imported rice: an import duty that was 
about 20% in the beginning of 2004 and a VAT tax of 20%.15 Combined with other duties, 
this raises the price level by 43%. Taking further transportation costs, wholesale and retail 
margins into account, it is estimated that retail prices in the Antananarivo market are almost 
130% above the wholesale international FOB prices (World Bank, 2004).  
 
Imported and local rice are close substitutes in Madagascar. Using the retail prices in 
Antananarivo, the ratio of the price of domestic rice to the price of imported rice averaged 
1.00 from 2000 through 2003. However, we see consistent seasonality differences: the 
seasonal index of the price ratio (price of domestic rice over the price of imported rice) 
ranged from 0.93 in June-August to 1.09 in March-April. In rural areas, imported and local 
prices are also strongly related, i.e. if both types of rice are available. However, as in urban 
areas, imported rice prices are slightly higher in the harvest period. In communes where no 
imported rice is found, local prices are significantly lower (explaining why there is no 
imported rice as it is unable to compete).    
 
While import parity prices and local prices in the city of Antananarivo are closely 
correlated, the setting of rural rice prices on the other hand suffers from the lack of market 
integration. Moser et al. (2005) estimate that that there is very little integration of markets at 
the national level, mostly due to prohibitively high transport costs. While they find that 
markets are fairly well integrated spatially at the sub-regional level, where nearly 70 percent 
of communes appear to be in competitive equilibrium, most of the evidence points to 
significant spatial and inter-temporal rural market fragmentation. 
 
                                                 
13 The rice subsidy reached 25% of the government budget in the mid-1980s prior to market reforms (Dorosh 
and Bernier, 1994).     
14 In the past, Madagascar has regularly changed rice taxation levels. In 1996, the tariff on rice was 30%, going 
down to 10% in 1997 and to 5% in 1999, before increasing, on top of a new value added tax of 20%, to 15% in 
2000 and to 20% in 2004. The current import tax on rice import is 15%. In 2005, the VAT was reduced to 18% 
and import duties to 10%. 
15 This VAT is in most cases not levied on locally produced rice and can thus be considered as a hidden import 
duty.  
 10
It has been shown that Malagasy rice production is highly competitive at the 
international level (Razafimandimby, 1999). The low production costs, due to low labor costs 
and the little use of inputs, make local rice production cheap. A domestic resource costs 
(DRC) analysis showed that DRCs are about 0.3, indicating that rice production is 
economically very profitable. However, competitiveness with international markets is lost in 
the value chain due to the large marketing costs involved due to remoteness, transport costs 
and the multiple actors involved in the value chain (Razafimandimby, 1999). 
 
However, there is no evidence of the existence of excessive rents in rice marketing. 
UPDR-FAO (2000) did a large nationwide survey on the structure of the margins between 
producers and consumers for local as well as imported rice in 1999. For local rice, about 58% 
of the final retail consumer price went to the producers, 7% to millers, 27% to traders and 8% 
to retailers. For imported rice, CAF price levels represented about 61% of the final retail 
price. Import duties made up 22% of the final price and wholesalers/traders and retailers each 
had a margin of about 8%. The larger margins for traders in the case of local rice reflect 
partly the larges costs related to local transport and assembly.  
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3. The 2004 crisis 
 
Marie-Hélène Dabat, Olivier Jenn-treyer, John Magnay and Bart Minten 
 
3.1.  Description of the crisis 
 
The situation in the rice markets in 2004 turned it into a major concern for consumers 
and policy makers. The average price of rice increased by 100% for the country as a whole at 
the end of 2004 compared to the end of 2003 (Minten and Ralison, 2005). This large price 
rise was found consistently in all provinces (Graph 12). Compared to the lean period of 2003, 
the harvest prices (April-June) changed very little. This is abnormal as rice prices normally 
decline significantly after harvest (Moser et al., 2004).16 The price rise after harvest on the 
other hand was significantly higher and faster than in a normal year. Graph 13 shows to what 
extent the year 2004 was exceptional over the last five years. We take the region of Lac 
Aloatra, the rice basket of Madagascar, as an example. Paddy prices in that area, as in the rest 
of Madagascar, are characterized by significant but fairly regular seasonal patterns, with high 
prices in the lean period and low prices in the harvest period. The average price rise between 
the lean period and harvest period price before the year 2004 was about 52%. In 2004, this 
increase was 150%.  
 
As major price increases for rice - as well as other major staples - happened after the 
main marketing season, most small farmers benefited little or not at all from these price 
increases. Graph 12 indicates that the price levels for agricultural products in most areas only 
started their increase from July-September 2004 on. The price levels during the period April-
June 2004, i.e. the main marketing season in Madagascar (Minten and Zeller, 2000), were 
only slightly higher than one year earlier. The increase in prices at the end of the year led 
thus to significant hardship for consumers. Graph 14 shows the percentage of communes that 
reported to be in the lean period in the year 2004 compared to a relatively normal year 2001 
(Minten and Ralison, 2005). The lean period in 2004 started considerably earlier than normal. 
While in a normal year, 50% of the communal focus groups state to be in the lean period in 
the month of November, this year this percentage was almost as high as 70%.  
 
The same price changes were noticed in urban consumer markets. For example, the 
price evolution in the city of Antananarivo is shown on Graph 15. Following its usual 
pattern, local rice prices increased in the beginning of the year, reached a peak (at about 3000 
Fmg/kg) in April and then declined or stabilized for two months. However, rice prices started 
then a rapid increase from the month of June onwards. In the beginning of 2005, prices were 
close to 6000 Fmg per kg. While the graph shows that imported rice was cheaper at the end 
of the year, it was however only available in rationed quantities.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Given the importance of rice in the diet and agricultural production systems in Madagascar, it seems that it is 
the price setter for agricultural produce (Ravelosoa et al., 1999). Prices of other agricultural products followed 
the trend that was noticed for rice and paddy. The price of maize increased by 58% compared to the same 
period of the year before while the price of cassava increased by 69%. 
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3.2. Events that triggered the crisis 
 
Faced with high prices that were partly beyond their control, the government 
intervened in rice markets in the second half of the year. To better understand the reasons 
why, we make a chronology of the important events that happened in the beginning of 2004 
that triggered the crisis and that put pressure on the government to intervene. 
 
Two cyclones in the beginning of the year 2004, Elita at the end of the month of 
January, and Gafilo in the beginning of the month of March, caused significant losses to a 
rice harvest that was expected to be good. It was estimated that there was damage - because 
of floods and heavy winds - on almost 500,000 ha of the 1,4 million hectares that were 
planted in the country overall. The loss in paddy was evaluated17 at 362,000 tons of paddy or 
250,000 tons of white rice, more than 10% of the rice production in a normal year. The 
commune survey of 2004 seem to confirm this bad year as 40% of the communes estimated 
to have had lower yields than in a normal year.18  
 
During the months of April-May, the situation seemed to normalize itself as the first 
harvests came in and put some downward pressure on rice prices. However, rice prices did 
not decrease as in normal years. Nervousness started increasing in June linked with the rapid 
depreciation of the Malagasy currency. The exchange rate changed from about 7,500 
Fmg/US in March to 11,500 Fmg/US in June, a rise of 53% (Graph 14).19 There were also 
less rice imports in the first six months of the year seemingly caused by this rapid change in 
the exchange rate but also because of the increase of international prices in rice. Thai (5% 
broken) rice prices increased from 212$/ton in January 2004 to 245$/ton in April 2004, an 
increase of 15% (Graph 16). Vietnamese rice (25% broken) increased by 21% during that 
same period. 
 
As local rice was quickly sold off after the harvest in the province of Antananarivo, 
suppliers started looking elsewhere and started earlier than normal bringing in rice from the 
Lac Alaotra area. While paddy prices were there about 1000 Fmg per kg in the beginning of 
June, prices increased by 100 Fmg per week and were already at 1400 Fmg/kg at the end of 
June, i.e. a 40% increase in one month. In August, paddy prices in the Lac Aloatra reached 
2700 Fmg/kg and rice prices increased to 4100 Fmg/kg in Antananarivo. These changes led 
to large concerns on the effect on consumption. There was however no clear statement by the 
government on how it would deal with the situation. Opposite positions were taken by 
different ministries. Some argued that the government had to let the markets deal with it 
while others proposed a straight fixation of the price.  
 
The private sector was also not passive under these events. As to reduce the price 
levels of imported rice, the private sector wanted to meet the Minister of Finance to propose 
that the government would take care of some of the costs (port charges, transport costs, 
                                                 
17 Joint evaluation mission of the PAM and the FAO. 
18 To mitigate the effects of these cyclones, the government started a rice distribution program where 4,000 tons 
of rice were distributed at a “prix bonifié” of 2400 Fmg per kg.  
19 This depreciation seems to have been partly due to a decline in the reserves of the Central Bank and the 
effects of a policy of lowering taxes on a large array of investment and consumption goods. 
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import duties) which would allow them to sell imported rice at a price that would be lower 
than 4500 Fmg. However, it never received any response to this request. Importers were 
hesitant to import given unclear signals of the government and rapidly changing import 
conditions (exchange rates and international prices of rice). Under these circumstances, local 
banks were also unwilling to provide credit and they actually discouraged importers to bring 
in imported rice. 
 
It thus seems that several factors combined to produce a large shock to the rice 
market between January and August 2004. The two most important ones were the rise in 
international rice prices and the exchange rate devaluation. The relative importance of these 
two in the setting of import parity price levels is shown in Graph 17. The exchange rate 
devaluation was the largest contributor to the nominal price increase in the markets of 
Antananarivo, especially in the beginning of the year. When the exchange rate appreciated 
slightly at the end of the year, the international rice prices started its increase, keeping the 
rice import parity levels about constant since June 2004. Actual prices increases on the 
market in Antananarivo started later due to lagged effects.   
 
Other factors might have contributed, but to a lesser extent than the two previous 
factors to the high price rise. The cyclones contributed to less availability of local rice, and 
especially so in rural areas, but this should have been equilibrated by international imports 
under a well-functioning market system. Other factors that played a role were the increase in 
international transport costs due to the increase in gasoil prices and the increase in demand 
for transport from China. It is estimated that transportation costs from Bangkok and 
Toamasina increased from 30 US$/ton to 45 US$/ton between 2003 and 2004. The optimistic 
official production statistics also seem to have been too high and might therefore have 
underestimated the need for rice imports. Finally, the higher tax rate that was decided in the 
beginning of 2004 (20% instead of 15%) increased the import parity price with another 5% 
compared to previous years. All these factors combined led to a significant increase of the 
real price of rice in 2004 (Graph 5). 
 
3.3. Intervention by the government  
 
The major objectives of government rice policy during the crisis period in mid-2004 
were to avoid a rice shortage and to reduce and stabilize the domestic price of rice for 
consumers. Two major factors seem to have influenced the policy of the government. First, 
the slow pace of private commercial imports in mid-2004 suggested that the private sector 
would not supply Madagascar with sufficient imported rice. Second, the policy option of 
lowering the tariff on imported rice was not adopted. While there was pressure of some 
donors to reduce tax duties as a way to help in the reduction of price levels, the government 
resisted this call, partly due to concerns to reach the HIPC targets for fiscal revenues. 
However, reducing the import duties would have reduced the cost of rice imports and would 
have led to an increase in private sector imports and lower prices of imported as well as local 
rice. 
 
Faced with this crisis, the full cabinet met in the middle of August and decided to 
explore the options of food aid and of importing rice commercially at advantageous 
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conditions. A mission of the Ministry of Commerce (including the Minister) traveled to Asia 
and signed a commercial deal with Thailand to import 100,000 tons of rice at a price of 272$ 
CAF. At the end of the month, the government announced officially that it would import 
100,000 tons of rice from Thailand.20 The government rice entered the Malagasy market 
between October 2004 and March 2005. However, the first loads of the government 
negotiated rice only started arriving in October (the first load of 13,000 tons arrived on 
20/10/2004 in Toamasina). This late arrival was explained by the difficulty of finding means 
of sea transport and the increase in the costs of sea transport. Given that the contract was 
negotiated on a CAF basis, the Thai suppliers had little incentive to look for a speedy - but 
were rather looking for a cheap - solution.  
 
The 100,000 tons of government rice that were initially agreed upon increased in 
reality to almost 200,000 tons in total in the beginning of 2005 (Table 14). Five companies 
took part in the import of the government rice: Magro, Rabenaivo, Silac, Mifidy and SCAA. 
The biggest beneficiary was the company Magro, a company with close connections to the 
government and a newcomer in rice imports, which imported about 70% of total government 
negotiated rice. These companies signed a “contrat de mandat” where the government 
accepted to delay the payment of import duties and to use rice donations to compensate for 
their losses. There was however no transparency on the exact import conditions and the level 
of duties that these companies had to pay and this situation remains unclear.21  
 
The importers that participated in the contract were asked to sell the government 
negotiated rice to wholesalers at 3,300 Fmg per kg and to retailers at 3,400 Fmg/kg. This rice 
was then being distributed by retailers at the price of 3,500 Fmg per kilo, i.e. significantly 
below market prices of imported as well as local rice.22’23 This low price led to huge 
demands for government rice. The government therefore resorted to a rationing scheme: a 
limited quantity was sold per person (3 to 5 kg) and significant opportunity costs were 
required for queuing. The distribution of the government rice was also largely focused on the 
big urban centers. This rice was, at least initially, rare in the smaller urban centers and non-
existent in rural areas. There were also complaints about the quality of the imported rice.  
 
As the government did not import enough rice to be sold at 3500 Fmg and as the 
commercial importers reduced imports due to the lack of transparency and uncertainty with 
respect to the government interventions, there was less rice on the market than in a normal 
year and this showed up in the local prices which increased above import parity levels. In 
some cases, prices increased extremely high:  for example, rice was sold at 8,000 Fmg in 
                                                 
20 5000 tons would be received as a gift. 
21 The government also asked for solidarity and aid towards reducing the effect of rice crisis at the national as 
well as the international level. However, this had little effect. Gifts from foreign countries were limited: 5000 
tons by China and 5000 tons by Thailand. National solidarity was limited to help by the army, some members of 
the National Assembly who helped in local distribution, and some private enterprises that organized local 
transport in the areas where they are active.    
22 However, the government often still helped in the distribution of this rice. In the region Analamanga, 
distribution was done by the army. Five trucks were used to help the regional authorities to distribute the rice at 
the communal level. Local mayors financed the costs of the transport personnel.  
23 Given the costs involved to get the rice in some more remote communes, rice was sold higher than the 
recommended 3500 Fmg/kg 
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Farafangana and at 11,000 Fmg in Vangandraino (in the Southeast of the country) in 
November. In Antalaha, prices went even up to 17,500 Fmg.   
 
In an effort to control price hikes in their regions, some local authorities (often the 
‘sous-prefet’) prohibited or limited the export of rice from their fivondronana through the use 
of ‘barrières économiques’ (Minten and Ralison, 2005). For example, traders that exported 
rice from the Lac Aloatra area needed a special authorization to export rice to Antananarivo. 
Mostly only larger traders and traders that were original from the area itself were given this 
type of permission. In some areas in the province of Antsiranana and Mahajanga, rice trade 
was limited to 5 bags per truck. This was for example the case in the Sofia (the fivondronana 
of Befandriana Nord, Madritsara, Bealanana) and the Sava region (the fivondronana of 
Vohemar and Andapa). 
 
These prohibitions in rice trade had the intended effect and led to a relatively lower 
rice price in these fivondronana where the prohibition of rice exports was the case. On the 
other hand, it led to higher prices in rice importing regions. For example, while transport 
costs between Andapa and Sambava were about 400 Fmg per kg, rice prices were in the latter 
city about 4000 Fmg per kg higher. Prices in Sambava were almost as high as 20,000 Fmg 
per kg at the end of December. These local regulations might therefore have increased rice 
price volatility in the country as a whole.  
 
Government interventions in rice markets seem to have exacerbated the effects of 
these shocks on the domestic rice market. Different factors contributed to uncertainty. First, 
the possibility of waiving or rebating import tariffs (equal to 45 percent of the c&f value of 
rice imports) on government-sponsored commercial imports of rice increased uncertainty for 
private imports through non-government sponsored trade. Second, the government 
announced a target price that was less than import parity so that imports would not be 
profitable.24 Third, when the government announced this policy and an importer wanted to 
leave the country with his shipment, the government detained the ship and obliged the owner 
to sell at the prices fixed by the government. 
 
Hence, the government policies discouraged private imports and reduced the total 
volume of imports and the total rice supply of Madagascar. Ultimately, imports in 2004 were 
only 151 thousand tons, compared to 254 thousand tons in 2003.25 The sales of government 
rice at an official price of 3500 FMG/kg led to a parallel market. The official price was below 
the import parity price (including tariffs) so that private sector imports were not profitable. 
Since the government did not have sufficient rice to meet all demand at the official price, 
sales at a price below open market prices resulted in rationing and a parallel market. This 
rationing is seen by the increases in local prices above the import parity levels at the 
beginning of 2005 (Graph 18).   
                                                 
24 For example, the largest rice importer in 2003, who did not take part in the import of government rice, 
canceled a contract for the import of 48,000 tons from Thailand in 2004 for which it had to pay 130,000 USD of 
cancellation fees. The importer preferred to do so instead of facing the uncertain Malagasy rice market. 
25 Note that this change in the level of imports is due not only to the changes in world prices and trade policy: 
other factors including the size of the rice harvest and changes in household income also have a major influence 
on rice trade flows. 
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The rice crisis in 2004 and interventions by the government led to clear losers and 
winners. Most of the rise in agricultural prices in 2004 happened when the majority of 
smaller farmers had sold their production. They were then faced by significantly higher 
prices in the lean period when most of the smaller farmers become net buyers of agricultural 
produce. The winners were the people that stored rice until the later part of the year and 
production areas where rice is harvested later (the Lac Alaoatra area and the Marovoay 
plane). At the consumption level, especially the poorest urban households seem to have 
benefited from the government negotiated rice. While the targeting worked reasonably well 
in urban areas26, this was less the case in rural areas: the government negotiated rice did not 
reach these areas very well; in the case it did reach them, it was often sold at a higher price 
than 3500 Fmg/kg. There were also reports of incidences of corruption (Dabat, 2005). Given 
the importance of the net buyers in rural areas, hardship increased significantly in the lean 
period of the year 2004 in rural areas: in the commune survey of 2004, a high 84% of the 
focus groups stated that their purchasing power went down in 2004 compared to earlier 
years.  
 
 
                                                 
26 However, there were large opportunity costs due to queuing. Dabat (2005) evaluates these overall costs at 
more than 10 million $. 
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4. The 2004 crisis aftermath and some lessons learnt  
 
John Magnay and Olivier Jenn-treyer 
 
4.1. The 2004 aftermath 
 
The year after the crisis, 2005, benefited from the absence of large exogenous shocks 
that had led to the crisis in 2004.  Little change was noted in exchange rates and international 
rice prices. 2004/2005 was also a very good production year, with no major natural disasters, 
and producers responded to high rice prices by planting significantly more paddy than in 
normal years. The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries estimated the national 
rice production in 2004/2005 at 3,4 million tons, an increase by more than 12% compared to 
2004. If true, this annual increase would be the largest in Madagascar in the last 45 years (cfr. 
Graph 3).  
 
After some hesitation on the best way forward, the government decided to eliminate 
the import tariffs at the end of July 2005; (the VAT remained, but was reduced for all 
products, from 20% to 18%). The government also declared formally that it would stay out of 
the rice market. Despite these (late) announcements, the markets were still not in their normal 
state in 2005, though. Rice prices did not follow regular season patterns, with prices 
relatively higher at harvest and lower in lean periods than in normal years, indicating that 
farmers may have stored excessively in expectation of high prices in the lean period.     
 
For example, Graph 19 shows that prices after the harvest dropped slightly but 
quickly started rising again. Evidence of the increased storage by rice farmers is evident from 
anecdotal information from farmers groups: Much more was stored in the GCV (Greniers 
Communs Villageois), a warehouse receipt system, in 2005 compared to a regular year. For 
example, Cecam, an important local micro-finance institution, provided financing for around 
25,000 tons in the GCVs compared to 17,500 tons that it originally planned. Given liquidity 
constraints, it even had to refuse some potential participants.  
 
The high prices attracted new imports, perhaps even more than demand would 
warrant.  About a dozen firms had substantial stocks by the end of the year of 2005. 
However, given that most imports were arranged on 90-days letters of credit with overseas 
suppliers, through commercial banks, imported stocks had to be sold at the end of 
2005/beginning of 2006.  As a result, there was further downward pressure on rice prices at 
harvest time.  Some evidence suggested that as much as half of the imported stock was not 
sold at the end of the lean period of 2005/2006.  
 
4.2. Some lessons learnt 
 
The 2004 crisis put rice markets back upfront in the policy arena. While the events of 
2004 were an unusual combination of events that will unlikely be repeated in the next years, 
lessons can however be learnt for a better organization of rice markets. The objectives for the 
government to allow for efficient functioning rice markets should be clear. It should prevent 
market shortages and high prices for consumers. However, it should also insure good prices 
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for producers and reduce government interventions to promote increased market efficiency. 
Achieving these objectives can be done through different actions in the short- and long-run. 
We focus here on the short-run 
 
4.2.1. Trust and transparency in policies 
 
The rice markets in Madagascar were at the time of the crisis characterized by little 
trust between the main agents (especially between the government and the private sector). 
Traders are often referred to as speculators and few people understand their costs and the 
type of services they provide. Lack of trust and poor communications lead to lack of 
transparency and therefore possibly higher margins and volatility. One of the objectives of 
better functioning rice markets should therefore be the development of clear and transparent 
policies with a level playing field for all actors. This would for example imply that the 
government is committed to fixing import tariffs at the start of the year and keep it fixed and 
the same for everybody.  
 
To improve trust and transparency, an industry dialogue, a forum for private sector to 
express its concerns to the government and others, should regularly be organized. The type of 
information that should freely be available and discussed by the different players in the chain 
would be that related to the identification of specific sectors for intervention, local and 
international rice markets, the identification and development of export and local markets for 
Malagasy rice, the adoption of quality standards and transformation technologies, etc. 
 
As a follow-up on these recommendations, a ‘Platforme de Concertation pour le 
Pilotage de la Filière Riz’ (PCP riz) was put in place at the end of July 2005. Government 
representatives and private operators are present in this group and have now a regular healthy 
dialogue on different issues with respect to rice trade, and the rice sector more broadly. 
 
4.2.2. Monitoring and evaluation 
 
Regular and updated monitoring and evaluation methods (a market information 
system) on rice - or agriculture produce in general - need to be put in place. This market 
information system would broadly disseminate statistics and analysis of rice markets, or 
agricultural markets in general. The type of data and analysis disseminated would be related 
to prices at the producer, wholesale and retail level and this in different parts of the country; 
production, storage and commercial surplus levels; international market evolutions; as well 
as import conditions.  
 
This information could be made available in a timely matter by using all kind of 
media that is currently widely available in Madagascar, even in rural areas (Andriantsoa et 
al., 2005). Diffusion of information could be done through internet and e-mail, newspapers, 
local and national TV, local and national radio, SMS, and simple blackboards in market 
places. Examples on the functioning and on lessons learned from this type of information 
system can be gotten from other countries in Africa (for example, Uganda). 
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In the middle of 2005, the government put in place a ‘Observatoire Economique de la 
Filière Riz’ which now publishes a weekly bulletin on prices that are now regularly collected 
in different parts of the country. It also collects, analyzes and disseminates other type of 
economic information related to the rice subsector (international prices, imports, legislation, 
etc.). Both initiatives have seemingly contributed to a more orderly rice market in 2005.  
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5. Price stabilization options 
 
Paul Dorosh and Bart Minten 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Fluctuations in rice prices can have major adverse effects on poor households in 
Madagascar.  High rice prices reduce real incomes of net rice consumers, leading to lower 
rice consumption.  Low rice prices harm net sellers of rice, reducing incentives for domestic 
production.  Even for households that are approximately self-sufficient in rice, large seasonal 
fluctuations in prices result in income losses as they sell rice from their own production at 
low prices and later buy rice from the market at higher prices. 
 
Various policy measures can be implemented to reduce price fluctuations and 
increase welfare of selected groups.  Government direct purchases of rice from producers or 
in markets can help support producer prices.  Similarly, government sales of rice from public 
stocks or imports can add to supplies and lead to reduced market prices.  Adjustments to 
import tariffs can also be used to insulate domestic markets from fluctuations in the costs of 
imported rice.  Alternatively, government subsidized sales can be targeted to particular 
groups, such as government workers or the urban poor.  Other interventions can also increase 
price stability, such as provision of credit and increased rural security to enable farmers to 
profitably store grain and establishment of export markets.   
 
This chapter focuses on the relative merits of two major price stabilization options to 
protect against high consumer prices: subsidized sales of government rice to target groups 
and adjustments in the import tariffs.  We first present the basic analytical framework 
involving supply, demand and price determination in Madagascar’s rice markets.  We then 
present model simulations estimating the effects of tariff adjustments on prices and 
household welfare.  Finally, we compare the costs of tariff adjustments with the costs of 
targeted subsidies. 
  
5.2. Analytical framework 
 
The effects of tariff changes on domestic rice prices, rice demand, domestic 
production and import levels can be estimated using a simple analytical framework as 
described below. 
Net supply of rice in Madagascar is calculated as the sum of net production and imports. We 
use a production estimate of 1.787 mn tons of rice (equivalent to 2.978 mn tons of paddy 
multiplied by 0.61 to adjust for milling, seed, feed and wastage).  Assuming a base level of 
imports of 200 thousand tons (and no change in stocks), net availability (consumption) is 
equal to 1.987 mn tons.   
As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, domestic rice prices in Madagascar have generally 
tracked the import parity price of rice, indicating that these two broad types of rice are very 
close substitutes in demand for Malagasy consumers.  Thus, the analysis assumes that, as 
long as Madagascar is a net rice importer, domestic prices are equal to the import parity price 
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of rice, i.e. the US$ cost and freight price of rice times the FMG/$ exchange rate, and 
adjusted for import tariffs (including the TVA) and marketing costs (transport, handling, 
storage, etc.) to domestic rice markets.    
Under these assumptions, any change in world prices, exchange rates or tariffs will 
result in a corresponding change in the import parity and domestic prices of rice.  Given 
these exogenous price changes, new levels of domestic demand and production can be 
calculated using assumed price elasticities of demand and supply.  Effects of these price 
changes on various household groups are estimated using data from the EPM on household 
rice consumption and production.  Sensitivity analysis is done using alternative estimates for 
these key parameters. 
 
Note that this simple annual model does not take into account seasonality of rice 
prices.  The implicit assumption in the model is that seasonal price fluctuations remain 
unchanged (in percentage terms) when average annual prices change.  Thus, in each 
simulation, producer prices in the immediate post-harvest season rise by the same percentage 
(relative to the base) as consumer prices.   
 
Moreover, this model implicitly assumes an integrated market across regions of 
Madagascar, i.e. prices throughout the country are assumed to be driven by the import parity 
price.  This does not necessarily require that markets are directly integrated with the 
Toamasina and Antananarivo markets, since rice is also imported into ports besides 
Toamasina.  Nonetheless, as discussed in chapter 2, even though imported rice is found in 
many rural markets in Madagascar, there remain large areas in which rice markets are 
effectively isolated from the national rice market throughout the year due to high transactions 
costs.  In the absence of effective price transmission from import parity to local rice prices, 
household demand and supply will not respond to changes in the import parity price.  
Because of this, the model will tend to overstate the overall price responsiveness of domestic 
demand and supply.  For this reason, the elasticities of supply and demand used in this 
analysis are deliberately chosen to be low. 
 
5.3. Implications of changes in rice import tariffs 
 
Effects on rice imports and tariff revenues 
 
Table 15 presents simulation results of the effects of the elimination of the 10% tariff 
on rice imports. Since some of the marketing costs are assumed to be fixed in FMG terms, 
the percentage change in the domestic rice price is only 6.9%. Four scenarios illustrate the 
effect of the elimination under different assumptions of price responsiveness of consumers 
and producers in Madagascar. Under the assumption of no change in quantities demanded or 
supplied (Simulation 1 with elasticities of supply and demand both equal to zero), the change 
in tariff rates results in a proportional decline in tariff revenues, which fall from $20.7 mn to 
only $13.8 mn (a 33 percent decline).   
 
If consumer demand falls with rising rice prices, the elimination of a tariff increases 
rice demand by 1.4 percent (with an elasticity of demand of -0.2, simulation 2) or 2.9 percent 
(with an elasticity of demand of -0.4, simulation 3).  To supply this demand (assuming 
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production is fixed), imports also rise from 200 thousand tons in the base scenario to 229 and 
258 thousand tons in simulations 2 and 3, respectively.  With greater import volume, tariff 
revenues decline less than in simulation 1 – by only $4.9 mn (24 percent) in simulation 2 and 
only $2.9 mn (14 percent) in simulation 3. 
 
If producers are also price-responsive, the 6.9 percent decrease in prices results in a 
30 thousand ton decline in rice production (1.4 percent, assuming an elasticity of supply of 
0.2, simulation 4). Combined with the effects of lower prices on consumer demand, this leads 
to an increase in imports to 283 thousand tons (13.8% of supply, compared to only 10.1% of 
supply in the base). Tariff revenues are $19.6 mn, only $1.1 mn (6 percent) below the base 
levels.   
 
Thus, these simulations indicate that, taking into account price-responsiveness of 
supply and demand for rice in Madagascar, elimination of the 10% tariff on rice has little 
effect on overall tariff (plus TVA) revenues for rice imports, because the volume of rice 
imports increases as the tariff rate is reduced.   
 
Impacts on households 
 
The effects of changes in rice tariffs and rice prices on household rice consumption 
and welfare depend to a large extent on whether the household is a net producer or consumer 
of rice.  Most households in Madagascar grow some rice (even urban households), so the 
beneficial effects of a decrease in rice prices for consumers is not as large as it would be if 
most households purchased all their rice.  For the poorest 60 percent of households in 
Madagascar, the ratio of production to total consumption is 98%; for the urban poor, this 
ratio is 74% (Table 16).  Even for rural rice deficit households,27 own production is equal to 
50% of rice consumption.  Moreover, there are significant numbers of almost self-sufficient  
poor households (1.36 million people in 269 thousand households, EPM 2001 data) that 
suffer net welfare losses when rice prices rise.    
 
Eliminating the 10% rice tariff and thus reducing the domestic rice price by 6.9% 
results in net benefits to the rural poor net buyers and the urban poor by a total of $9.6-9.9 
mn (Table 17), with the estimated benefit increasing as the price responsiveness of supply 
and demand increase.  However, rural poor surplus producers suffer a welfare loss of $7.8 to 
8.2 mn because of the lower rice price.28  Thus, the net benefits to all poor (including also the 
rural self-sufficient households) are only $0.7 to $1.5 mn.   
 
In a year of high import parity prices of rice that raises domestic prices, producers of 
rice gain relative to normal price years, even with a decline in the rice tariff.  Reducing the 
                                                 
27 The rice deficit households are those household that purchase at least 25 kg more rice (calculated based on the 
consumption section of the national household survey) than they sell (estimated based on the agricultural 
section of the survey). The self-sufficient are those than sell about equal quantities than they buy (plus or minus 
25 kg). 
28 Note that net sellers gain in simulation 4 (relative to the other simulations) with an elasticity of supply greater 
than zero.  This is because, since their production falls, they have less net sales and are harmed less by the 
decline in prices caused by the reduction in tariffs.   
 
 23
rice tariff simply mitigates the welfare loss of high rice prices to net consumers (and reduces 
the windfall gains to net rice producers).  In these simulations, the government forgoes $1.1 
mn (Simulation 4 with high price responsiveness) to $6.9 mn (Simulation 1 with no price 
responsiveness) in revenues in order to transfer benefits of $9.6 to $9.9 mn to poor net 
consumers.  The ratio of benefits to poor net rice consumers to lost tariff revenues is 1.4 to 
8.7, with the most plausible estimates ranging from 2.0 to 8.7 (simulations 2 through 4). 
 
It is also important to note that reductions in rice tariffs have substantial benefits for 
non-poor net rice consumers, as well as costs for non-poor net rice producers.  Most of these 
non-poor households are net rice consumers; including these households into the estimated 
benefits to net rice consumers raises total estimated benefits substantially, i.e. ranging 
between $30.5 mn and $31.5 mn (compared with $8.4 mn to $8.7 mn considering only poor 
net consumers).  Thus, the most plausible estimates of the ratio of benefits to net consumers 
relative to lost tariff revenues rises overall to a range of 6.3 to 27.5.  Net gains to all 
households also rise to a range of $8.1 mn to $9.8 mn (compared to only $0.7 mn to $1.5 mn 
considering only poor households).  These net benefits to the non-poor come at no additional 
cost to the government (in terms of additional lost tariff revenues), but are not necessarily the 
major objective of the price stabilization through tariff reduction policy.   
 
In order to help the poorest consumers, the government might also want to pursue a 
policy of targeted transfers. In theory, a targeted direct cash transfer (or targeted subsidized 
sales of rice of the same value) could avoid the welfare losses for net sellers, while providing 
the same benefits to net consumers as a general rice price reduction. However, good targeting 
of the poor would be hard to achieve in a country such as Madagascar where information on 
income or assets is not easily available. 29 Administrative costs of targeting and distribution, 
as well as the likelihood of leakages, would raise the costs of such a program significantly 
(Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988).  For illustration purposes, we calculate the cost of the type of 
targeted program that the government set up during the crisis of 2004 (Table 18). We assume 
in this calculation that 5 kg of rice is sold at a reduced price for the two poorest quintiles - 
and not only the urban poor that the government focused on during the crisis -  during a six 
month period (the lean period). Under the assumption that all households would use their 
ration - and imputing administrative costs of 25% and leakage costs of 10% -, the annual cost 
of such a program would amount to 31 million$. 
 
5.4 Medium-term rice price stabilization options 
 
Although the above analysis suggests that lower tariffs have large net benefits in 
Madagascar, frequent tariff adjustments could undermine the transparency of government 
rice policy, increasing uncertainty and thus reducing incentives for private sector imports.  
Moreover, changes in rice tariffs could lead to strong political pressure to reduce tariffs on 
other products in an ad hoc fashion, resulting not only in a distorted and complex trade 
                                                 
29 Targeting can also be accomplished by using economically inferior foods. Cassava could potentially fulfill 
this role. Ravelosoa et al. (1999) and Minten and Zeller (2000) illustrate the negative income elasticity for 
cassava and its characteristics as an inferior crop mainly consumed by the poor. Ravelosoa and al. (1999) 
estimate that the income elasticity for cassava is around –0.88, meaning that if income goes up by 1%, cassava 
consumption declines by 0.88%. 
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regime, but also in a substantial loss of tariff revenues and a flood of imports.  Thus, it is 
important that tariff adjustments be kept to a minimum and that a clear and transparent rice 
price stabilization is put into place. 
 
In this section, we discuss two main options for rice price stabilization: liberalized 
private sector trade to provide an import parity ceiling price of rice, and liberalized trade in 
combination with a government stock (not necessarily directly managed or held by the 
government).  This latter policy entails additional complications beyond that related to 
adjustable import tariffs – the risk that government domestic market interventions will 
increase over time and result in large fiscal costs and market inefficiencies. 
 
Option 1: Liberalized private sector trade 
 
One option to stabilize prices in Madagascar would be to rely on international trade 
and periodic tariff adjustments to set the ceiling price of rice. This policy would involve no 
government or publicly managed stocks, no restrictions on private market imports (apart 
from tariffs), and import tariff adjustments to be set each year at time of major harvest 
(March/April) and fixed for one year.30  These import tariffs would be set at a price to 
maintain private sector incentives for imports at expected world prices.  The key to this price 
stabilization through private imports policy, however, would be transparency and a level 
playing field, i.e. a common set of tariffs, rules and information for all market participants.31   
 
The above analysis suggests that reductions in rice import tariffs in years with high 
import parity prices can effectively mitigate the adverse effects of sharp increases in prices 
on poor consumers in Madagascar.  In years when world prices and exchange rates have not 
risen substantially relative to the previous year, no tariff adjustments would be needed to 
maintain a substantial degree of price stability. In case of local production shortfalls 
coinciding with very high import parity prices, the government might want to intervene by 
lowering import tariffs or even by providing an import subsidy (negative tariffs). Donor food 
aid stocks could also provide a small emergency stock for targeted safety net distribution in 
such a case. 
 
Option 2: Liberalized trade with rice security stocks 
 
                                                 
30 General tariffs are set in the context of the Loi des Finances, which is sent to Parliament at the end of October 
each year and is voted before the beginning of the calendar year. If the import tariff is to be changed at the time 
of major harvest, some special steps would need to be followed. 
31 Bangladesh successfully implemented such a policy in 1998 following major production shortfalls.  By 
encouraging private sector import trade, domestic prices were stabilized at import parity levels (Dorosh, 2001).  
In contrast, during the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998, Indonesia tried to maintain domestic rice prices 
40 to 50 percent below import parity levels, a policy which resulted in large-scale smuggling of rice out of the 
country.  Ultimately, in mid-1998, the government was unable to supply enough imported rice to domestic 
markets, domestic rice prices rose sharply, and by August 1998, the government abandoned its general food 
price subsidy policy (FAO, 2003; Tabor and Sawit, 2001).  From January 1999 to January 2004, private imports 
were liberalized (albeit with a fixed nominal tariff beginning in January 2000), though licensing restrictions 
were re-imposed in 2004 (World Bank, 2004b). 
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A second broad policy option would involve a rice security stock, not necessarily 
managed by the government, but under government control. This government stock would 
not need to  be large: A set fixed target amount equal to 2 to 3 months of normal seasonal 
imports (about 60 thousand tons) would likely be sufficient.  To avoid disincentives to local 
producers, the sales/release price should be announced prior to main planting season and held 
fixed for one year.  And to avoid disincentives for private sector imports, the sales/release 
price should be significantly higher than the expected import parity price.  This would also 
avoid that the private sector sees a government stock as a threat to prevent normal upward 
price movements between harvests and the government stock would thus simple displace 
private storage. Stocks could be rotated through government sales at import parity (including 
tax) and government tenders for commercial imports. To avoid having impact on prices, it 
would be needed to have sales and purchases of rotations take place simultaneously or within 
a short period of time.  
 
Such a policy of government stocks and domestic market interventions risks 
substantial fiscal losses, corruption, and private market disincentives if government expands 
stocks, the policy is not transparent, or the government intervenes heavily in local markets. 
Unfortunately, this has been the usual experience in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere 
(Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988). Given the small size of typical rice market shortfalls, very rough 
initial calculations suggest that costs of even relatively small stocks in Madagascar may not 
outweigh advantages. Assuming a stock of 60,000 tons with $30/ton annual storage costs, the 
total annual costs would be $1.8 mn.  Major production shortfalls in Madagascar occur about 
one in four years. Average costs (including costs of stock rotation, etc.) per major production 
shortfall may thus amount to almost $8 million.   
 
Under either of these options, flexibility in adjusting the import tariff, once per year, 
in line with expectations of the world price of rice is needed.  This differs from a variable 
tariff policy in that it is more transparent and less complicated – important considerations in 
Madagascar’s current atmosphere of mistrust between government and many private sector 
traders. 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
 
Paul Dorosh and Bart Minten  
 
The rice economy of Madagascar is heavily dependent on international trade, but 
urban consumers of rice in the country typically pay prices significantly higher than the 
world market prices while producers receive prices below the world market. This seeming 
paradox is explained by government trade policy and high internal marketing costs. Given 
import tariffs and taxes on imported rice totaling over 30 percent in recent years, prices of 
imported (and local) rice in wholesale and retail markets in urban centers in Madagascar are 
above world price levels.  At the same time, high costs of transport, rural insecurity, lack of 
credit and other problems in the marketing chain result in high transactions costs that limit 
trade and depress producer prices.   
 
Moreover, production and price instability is a major threat to food security.  The 
experience of 2004, where a production shortfall coincided with a sharp increase in the local 
price of rice imports, highlights the fragile nature of rice supplies to Madagascar.  
Government policies, particularly a lack of transparency, harassment of importers, 
uncertainty regarding tariff levels and enforcement, and an official sales price that made 
private sector imports paying full tariffs unprofitable, ultimately made the situation worse.   
 
Major public investments and sound policies are essential to increase rice production 
and improve the efficiency of rice markets in Madagascar.  Investments in irrigation are 
needed to solve problems of inadequate volume and timing of irrigation water which are 
major constraints on domestic production. Fertilizer use and agricultural productivity are 
limited in part by high marketing costs and inappropriate composition of available fertilizers. 
Low producer prices, reflecting the high costs of transport and marketing provide inadequate 
incentives for production in most years in most parts of the country.   
 
Investments in road infrastructure can help reduce marketing costs and increase 
welfare of producers and consumers, particularly in isolated communities.  Other measures to 
reduce transactions costs of rice trade and trade in other commodities include improved 
credit systems, increased rural security to prevent thefts of stocks and goods in transit, and 
better functioning mechanisms for enforcement of contracts.  Market information systems 
that disseminate information on prices and production levels can help farmers, traders and 
consumers make better decisions on purchases, sales and storage. Restoring trust and 
improving communications between rice traders and government agencies is further crucial 
for improving the efficiency of imported and local rice trade flows. 
 
The results in this report also show the importance of stable macro policies - since the 
exchange rate devaluation was the biggest contributor to the price spike in 2004 - and of 
policies to encourage private sector storage. Direct imports by the government should also be 
discouraged because, as seen in 2004, a lack of transparency surrounding government 
imports can discourage private imports, resulting in overall imports that might actually be 
lower than in a liberalized market.     
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Appropriate public policies might protect poor net consumers from high prices 
resulting from domestic production shortfalls and adverse international price and exchange 
rate movements.  Since Madagascar is a net rice importing country, and since domestic and 
local rice are very good substitutes, changes in the cost of imported rice in domestic markets 
(the import parity price) to a large extent determines the price of local rice.  In this situation, 
as long as incentives for competitive private sector trade are maintained, this import parity 
price provides a price ceiling for domestic prices in the country, and transparent and pre-
announced tariff reductions can be used to mitigate the effects of increases in the price of 
imported rice on poor consumers.   
 
Initial estimates presented in this report suggest that these tariff adjustments result in 
small losses of tariff revenues (since reductions in tariff rates also increase the quantity of 
imports) with benefits to poor net rice consumers estimated to be between 2.0 to 8.7 times the 
value of lost tariff revenues. Moreover, these benefits are achieved without the high 
administrative costs of a direct transfer program or maintenance of government stocks.32   
 
Finally, more and ongoing analysis of price stabilization options and market 
developments are needed, as market conditions change over time. Regular consultation 
between government and the private sector is part of this process; long-term efforts at 
building analytical capacity of the government are required, as well.   
 
                                                 
32 This discussion of adjustments to rice tariff levels has not addressed the issue of what 
should be the base level of tariff on rice imports or whether rice imports should be exempt 
from the value-added tax (since domestic rice production is not subject to this tax).  A full 
analysis of this issue would require considerable further analysis of costs of rice production, 
supply constraints, various distortions in the economy and other factors, and is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  Instead, this discussion assumes that rice tariffs broadly defined 
(including the import tariff and the value added tax) are greater than zero, so that the 
government has the option, in principle, to adjust the rate if international market and 
domestic economic considerations so warrant. 
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Graph 1: Most important crop area wise by commune, as stated by focus groups (2001)  
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Graph 2: Most important crop value wise by commune, as stated by focus groups 
(2001)
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Graph 3: Annual growth rates in paddy production and population
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Graph 4: Evolution of rice yields (1961-2004)
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Graph 5: Retail rice prices in Antananarivo from 1985 to 2005 
(prices in FMG 2005; deflated by non-rice price index) (source: INSTAT)
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Graph 6: Adoption of chemical fertilizer, as stated by focus groups 
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Graph 7: The presence of imported rice by commune at the end of 
2001
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Graph 8: Lorenz curve of rice production and sales for agricultural producers in 
Madagascar (Source: EPM 2001, INSTAT)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
% of households
%
 o
f p
ro
du
ct
io
n/
sa
le
s Cumulative production
Cumulative sales
Diagonal
 
 
Graph 9: Percentage of rural communes that import rice from and export rice to other 
communes in lean and harvest period
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Graph 10: Monthly paddy production (Source: EPM 2001, INSTAT)
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Graph 11: Monthly rice sales (Source: EPM 2001, INSTAT)
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Graph 12: Prices of paddy (quality C2) - producer prices
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Graph 13: Paddy prices in the Lac Aloatra region (Ariary per kg)
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Graph 14: Percentage of communes that are in the lean period
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Graph 15: Rice prices in Antananarivo in 2004
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Graph 16: Evolution of exchange rate and international rice prices in 2004
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Graph 17: Simulated rice import parity levels (Fmg/kg) on Antananarivo retail markets
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Figure 18: Rice prices and import parity levels on retail markets Antananarivo
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Ja
n-0
2
Ma
r-0
2
Ma
y-0
2
Ju
l-0
2
Se
p-0
2
No
v-0
2
Ja
n-0
3
Ma
r-0
3
Ma
y-0
3
Ju
l-0
3
Se
p-0
3
No
v-0
3
Ja
n-0
4
Ma
r-0
4
Ma
y-0
4
Ju
l-0
4
Se
p-0
4
No
v-0
4
Ja
n-0
5
Fm
g/
kg
Import parity Tana market Vietnam rice 25%
Import parity Tana market Thai rice 5%
Imported rice price
Local rice
 
 
 
Graph 19: Rice prices in 2005/2006
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Table 1: Adoption of agricultural technologies        
(percentage of adopters based on declarations of communal focus groups)     
                  
  Percentage of agricultural households 
Improved technology   >75% 50-75% 25-50% 5-25% <5% Nobody Total 
Transplanting in line 2004 8 12 8 10 20 42 100
 1990 3 4 6 13 18 56 100
Use of chemical fertilizer 2004 5 6 7 12 17 53 100
 1990 2 2 4 8 21 63 100
Use of organic fertilizer 2004 22 13 6 10 20 30 100
 1990 20 10 10 7 15 39 100
Use of pesticides/herbicides 2004 5 5 5 15 24 45 100
 1990 4 1 3 10 23 58 100
Use of improved rice varieties 2004 6 5 7 7 18 58 100
  1990 4 6 5 4 13 68 100
Source: Commune survey, 2004         
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Table 2: Stated constraints to rice productivity    
(% of focus groups that said this constraint was ‘important’ or ‘very important’) 
      
Constraint %    
Land tenure 36   
Access to livestock to work the land 70   
Access to livestock for manure 42   
Access to labor 56   
Access to agricultural equipment 77   
Access to chemical fertilizer 42   
Access to improved seeds 58   
Access to better irrigation systems 85   
Access to credit 60   
Avoid silting 41   
Avoid losses due to plant diseases 58   
Avoid floods 57   
Avoid droughts 37   
Source: Commune survey, 2004    
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Table 3: Effect of remoteness on agricultural practices, by commune     
              
 Remoteness quintile 
  National Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Time to get to closest urban center (hours) 11 3 5 10 18 22
Part of auto-consumption in food consumption 35 16 35 40 43 42
Poverty (head count ratio) 77 54 77 85 85 86
Rice yields (tons/ha) 2.2 3.5 2.5 1.9 1.7 1.7
Technology adoption - % of households…        
… that use chemical fertilizer 11 27 28 6 5 1
… that use organic fertilizer 28 74 51 17 12 13
Source: Stifel et Minten (2003)       
 
Table 4: Average calorie consumption in Madagascar (per capita/day)   
              
  Year 
    1970 1980 1990 2002 2003 
Average calorie consumption 2397 2369 2138 2005 2056 
 vegetable products 2131 2123 1909 1815 1884 
 animal products 265 246 229 190 172 
       
Calorie consumption from cereals 1385 1327 1137 1085 1174 
 of which rice 1239 1197 1013 973 1001 
Calorie consumption from starchy 
roots 393 409 477 476 396 
  of which cassava 283 311 374 398 323 
Source: FAO - Food balance data      
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Table 5: Seasonal consumption and substitution        
                    
  Total caloric consumption Change in the composition of 
Type of household by season caloric consumption (part lean vs harvest) 
          
    harvest lean period difference rice cassava 
other 
tubers maize others 
Rural households         
 Poor in the South 1979 1790 -11% -13% 7% 2% 7% -3%
 Non-poor in the South 2975 2810 -6% -13% 7% 2% 5% -1%
          
 Poor in the rest of the country 2103 1873 -12% -8% 4% 4% 2% -2%
 Non-poor in the rest of the country 2804 2540 -10% -6% 3% 3% 1% 0%
          
Urban households         
 Poor 2033 1932 -5% -1% 1% 1% 0% -1%
  Non-poor 2343 2252 -4% -1% 0% 0% 0% 1%
     Importance as source of calories 
     (100%=annual calorie consumption) 
Rural households         
 Poor in the South    21% 25% 6% 23% 23%
 Non-poor in the South    20% 28% 8% 20% 24%
            
 Poor in the rest of the country    53% 16% 11% 6% 15%
 Non-poor in the rest of the country    56% 12% 7% 5% 20%
          
Urban households         
 Poor    60% 10% 5% 4% 22%
  Non-poor       54% 3% 2% 3% 37%
Source: Dostie et al. (2000)         
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Table 6: Rice production and sales in Madagascar    
            
    
Type of agricultural 
households    
 Unit No sales Small sales Large sales Total  
      (<250 kg of rice) (>250 kg of rice)   
% of agricultural producers % 48 28 24 100
Expenditures per capita Fmg/capita 748618 587692 914736 742008
Rice production kg/household 561 592 2509 1030
Rice sales kg/household 0 110 1201 315
Total rice production million tons 527 332 1167 2025
Total rice sales million tons 0 62 558 620
Source: EPM 2001, INSTAT-DSM     
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Table 7: Purchases and sales of rice in Madagascar      
              
   Rural   Urban Total 
  Unit 
Net 
buyers 
Self-
sufficient Net sellers     
% of households % 46 11 19 24 100
Expenditures per capita Fmg/capita 683746 647046 805308 909069 742008
Average per household       
Rice production kg/household 262 490 1917 301 611
Rice sales kg/household 15 23 849 66 187
Rice purchases (total) kg/household 334 27 65 404 266
Imported rice purchases kg/household 47 5 4 58 37
Local rice purchases kg/household 287 22 60 346 229
Percentage in total       
Rice production % 20 9 60 12 100
Rice sales % 4 1 86 9 100
Rice purchases (total) % 57 1 5 37 100
Imported rice purchases % 58 1 2 38 100
Local rice purchases % 57 1 5 37 100
Source: INSTAT-EPM, 2001       
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Table 8: Location of net sellers and buyers      
              
 % of households Total number of households Share of total 
Province 
net seller of 
rice 
net buyer of 
rice 
net seller of 
rice 
net buyer of 
rice 
net seller of 
rice 
net buyer of 
rice 
Antananarivo 12% 82% 114,533 800,065 16% 34%
Fianarantsoa 20% 75% 131,758 498,789 18% 21%
Toamasina 22% 67% 125,147 373,234 17% 16%
Mahajanga 45% 48% 164,872 177,544 23% 8%
Toliara 25% 68% 119,274 321,637 17% 14%
Antsiranana 22% 68% 60,685 183,907 8% 8%
         
Total 22% 71% 716,269 2,355,176 100% 100%
Source: INSTAT-EPM 2001      
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Table 9: Poverty and market participation 
Consumption quintile
Unit Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Total 
Rice purchasing status (whole population)
Net rice buyer % of pop. 54 59 61 66 81 66
Self-sufficient % of pop. 25 14 15 10 7 13
Net rice seller % of pop. 21 28 24 24 12 21
Purchases (the whole population)
Quantity of rice bought kg/household 132 174 234 307 391 266
Of which imported rice kg/household 17 23 34 45 53 37
Living in urban areas % 8 12 17 27 44 24
Rice market participation (by agricultural producers)
Produce rice % 86 85 83 87 86 85
Quantity produced kg/household 427 701 950 1076 1190 844
Sold rice % 40 46 47 46 42 44
Quantity sold kg/household 117 156 273 269 412 232
Bought rice % 78 78 76 70 69 75
Quantity bought kg/household 130 163 205 202 261 187
Of which imported rice kg/household 17 21 29 38 35 27
Sold and bought rice in one year % 30 31 30 25 20 28
Use of rice kg/household 440 708 881 1008 1038 799
Source: INSTAT-EPM 2001
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Table 10: Import characteristics of five largest importers in 2004   
            
Name  
# of 
shipments 
Total 
quantity  Value CAF 
Average 
price Market share in % 
    1000 tons million $ $/ton CAF 
(of commercial imported 
quantity) 
Nivoniaina 4 14.5 3.2 221 17
Felana 4 10.0 2.6 260 12
Scim 4 9.4 2.0 213 11
Cociama 7 7.5 1.7 227 9
Olam Madagascar 8 7.4 1.5 203 9
      
Total for 5 largest importers 27 48.8 11.0 225 59
Source: Authors' calculations based on Ministere de Commerce, 2004   
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Table 11: Monthly rice imports in Madagascar (in tons)        
                    
          year         
Month 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
January 271 5 743 8 806 13 212 24 757 29 725 10 330 38 176 30 391
February 841 9 067 10 540 14 482 24 921 32 680 1 900 36 088 6 601
March 640 8 750 8 206 10 609 15 984 32 518 8 37 269 11 750
April 1 827 7 523 4 162 9 292 9 199 23 994 1 800 18 763 5 049
May 2 343 6 127 1 182 6 840 3 374 20 564 2 705 16 788 1 085
June 2 354 3 997 703 8 072 5 997 14 298 0 13 307 356
July 1 479 2 983 689 3 896 6 491 11 044 1 6 310 873
August 563 969 3 214 3 580 13 963 4 051 4 501 10 340 21 000
September 861 801 3 262 172 15 540 1 487 5 380 5 429 731
October 862 1 429 3 992 2 896 28 393 6 484 12 843 22 503 13 000
November 1 189 2 918 2 299 10 723 27 055 2 522 10 495 20 186 12 042
December 3 533 5 702 8 320 19 772 31 698 9 286 11 549 29 143 43 136
Total 16 763 56 009 55 375 103 546 207 372 188 653 61 512 254 302 146 014
Total first 6 months 8 276 41 207 33 599 62 507 84 232 153 779 16 743 160 391 55 232
% first six months over total 49% 74% 61% 60% 41% 82% 27% 63% 38%
Source: INSTAT until 2003 - MICDSP 2004         
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Table 12: Monthly staple price variability in some selected developing countries ($/ton)  
Bangladesh India Zambia Ethiopia Madagascar Madagascar
National Ave. Delhi Lusaka Addis Antananarivo Antananarivo
Wholesale Wholesale Retail Retail Retail Retail
Coarse Rice Coarse Rice White Maize Maize Rice Rice
$/ton $/ton $/ton $/ton $/ton $/ton
Period 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 2003-2004
Average Price 240.9 218.7 191.8 127.7 397.2 421.3
Standard Deviation 32.0 23.0 59.4 39.6 49.4 59.7
Coef. of Variation 0.133 0.105 0.310 0.310 0.015 0.02
Maximum 307.1 266.0 352.1 225.7 538.8 572.8
Minimum 193.5 184.0 100.9 55.7 313.3 279.3
Max/Min 1.59 1.45 3.49 4.05 1.71 2.05
Max/Mean 1.27 1.22 1.84 1.77 1.36 1.36
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Table 13: Composition of marketing margins for imported rice in January 2004 
        
  Unit Price   
FOB Bangkok price $/MT 212   
Freight $/MT 45   
Insurance $/MT 3   
CAF Price $/MT 260   
Ex Rate Fmg/$ 6451   
CIF price Fmg/kg 1677   
Banking costs Fmg/kg 50   
Port charges Fmg/kg 117   
Tariff (20%) Fmg/kg 335   
Price magasin Fmg/kg 2180   
Importer's margin Fmg/kg 109   
Price before VAT Fmg/kg 2289   
VAT (20%) Fmg/kg 335   
Import parity Toamasina Fmg/kg 2625   
Wholesale margin Fmg/kg 79   
Transport to Antananarivo Fmg/kg 175   
Retail margin Fmg/kg 86   
Import parity Antananarivo Fmg/kg 2965   
Source: Authors' calculations based on World Bank (2004a)  
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Table 14: Rice imports in 2004 and 2005 (tons)     
              
 Imports in 2004  Imports in 2005  
  Commercial Government sponsored Total Commercial 
Government 
sponsored Total 
January 30 391  30 391 7511 21 350 28 861 
February 6 601  6 601 25695 37 900 63 595 
March 11 750  11 750 25 23 175 23 200 
April 5 049  5 049 ??? 17 800 17 800 
May 1 085  1 085    
June 356  356    
July 873  873    
August 21 000  21 000    
September 731  731    
October 0 13000 13 000    
November 3 342 8700 12 042    
December 1 921 41215 43 136       
Total 83 099 62 915 146 014 33 231 100 225 133 456 
Source: MICDSP      
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Table 15: Effects of Tariff Changes on Imports and Tariff Revenues 
 
 Base Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4 
  
Elasticities (demand,supply)  (0,0) (-0.2,0) (-0.4,0) (-0.4,0.2)
  
Production (paddy, mn tons) 2.978 2.978 2.978 2.978 2.936
      
Rice Production (mn tons) 1.787 1.787 1.787 1.787 1.762
Imports (mn tons) 0.200 0.200 0.229 0.258 0.283
      
Total Supply (mn tons) 1.987 1.987 2.016 2.045 2.045
      
Elasticity of demand --  0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
Elasticity of supply --  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
      
Import Tariff (percent) 10 0 0 0 0
Price (= import parity) (FMG/kg) 5200 4841 4841 4841 4841
      
% change demand --  0.0% 1.4% 2.9% 2.9%
% change price --  -6.9% -6.9% -6.9% -6.9%
 57
Change in imports (mn tons) --                -                0.03           0.06         0.08  
% change in imports --  0% 14% 29% 42%
Implicit import elasticity --  0.0 -2.1 -4.2 -6.0
      
Tariff revenues (bn FMG) 207 138 158 178 196
Tariff revenues (mn $) 20.7 13.8 15.8 17.8 19.6
Change in tariff revs (mn $) --  -6.9 -4.9 -2.9 -1.1
% reduction in tariff revs --  -33% -24% -14% -6%
      
Imports/Supply 10.1% 10.1% 11.3% 12.6% 13.8%
Value of Imports (mn $) 57.0 57.0 65.2 73.4 80.7
Source: Model simulations. (Note that total tariffs on rice in the base case consist of a rice import tariff of 10% and a value added tax of 20 
percent. The total tariff is equal to 36% of the cost and freight price of rice). 
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Table 16: Rice consumption and production according to household net rice sales groups, 2001    
                  
    Rural        
    Net buyers Self-sufficient Net sellers Urban Total Rural 
Net 
buyers 
Total Population        
Total population 7.321 1.682 3.082 3.583 15.668 12.085 10.903 
Total # households 1.519 0.366 0.626 0.805 3.315 2.510 2.324 
Pop/HH  4.82 4.60 4.92 4.45 4.73 4.81 4.69 
% of total population 46.7% 10.7% 19.7% 22.9% 100.0% 77.1% 69.6% 
         
Rice production (kgs/HH) 231 433 1,692 265 539           625            243  
Rice use (kgs/HH) 550 436 812 603 600 599            568  
Rice consumption (kgs/person) 114.1 94.8 165.0 135.5 126.9        124.4         121.5  
Rice consumption ('000 tons) 835 160 509 485 1,989 1,503         1,321  
% production / use 42% 99% 208% 44% 90% 104% 43% 
Poorest 60% of Population        
Total poor population 4.666 1.361 2.179 1.196 9.402 8.205 5.862 
Total # poor households 0.851 0.269 0.377 0.219 1.715 1.497 1.070 
Pop/HH  5.48 5.07 5.78 5.47 5.48 5.48 5.48 
% of Total Poor 49.6% 14.5% 23.2% 12.7% 100.0% 87.3% 62.4% 
% of Total Population 29.8% 8.7% 13.9% 7.6% 60.0% 52.4% 37.4% 
         
Rice production (kgs/HH) 242 424 1,470 387 559           584            272  
Rice use (kgs/HH) 485 356 935 522 568           575            492  
Rice consumption (kgs/person) 88.4 70.3 161.8 95.5 103.7        104.9           89.9  
Rice consumption ('000 tons) 413 96 352 114 975 861            527  
% production / use 50% 119% 157% 74% 98% 102% 55% 
Source: Calculated from EPM 2001 data       
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Table 17: Effects of Tariff Changes on Household Welfare
Base Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4
(kgs/cap.) (mn $) (mn $) (mn $) (mn $)
Import tariff (percent) 10 0 0 0 0
Elasticities (demand,supply) --  (0,0) (-0.2,0) (-0.4,0) (-0.4,0.2)
Poorest 60% of Households
  Rural Net Buyers 88 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7
  Rural Self-Sufficient 70 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
  Rural Surplus 162 -7.2 -7.2 -7.1 -6.9
  Urban 95 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
  Total 104 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3
  Net Buyers* 90 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.8
  Change in tariff revs (mn $) --  -6.9 -4.9 -2.9 -1.1
  Net Benefit/Lost Tariff Revenue --  1.2 1.8 3.0 7.7
All Households 
  Rural Net Buyers 114 17.4 17.6 17.8 17.9
  Rural Self-Sufficient 95 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
  Rural Surplus 165 -19.8 -19.7 -19.5 -19.3
  Urban 135 9.8 9.9 10.0 10.1
  Total 127 7.2 7.8 8.3 8.7
  Net Buyers* 121 27.1 27.5 27.8 28.0
  Change in tariff revs (mn $) --  -6.9 -4.9 -2.9 -1.1
  Net Benefit/Lost Tariff Revenue --  3.9 5.6 9.6 24.5
*Rural net buyers and all urban households.
Source: Model simulations  
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